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DELIVERING PUBLIC PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS IN THE EU:
THE COMPETITIVE DIALOGUE
AS A PROCUREMENT PROCESS
A new public procurement regime1 which governs the
award of public contracts in the supplies, works and
services sectors, as well as in utilities, has been operational
since January 31, 2006. The new public procurement
Directives have been seen as an integral part of the
Commission’s 2000 Work Programme, which pledges to
modernize the relevant legislation for the completion of
the internal market and at the same time implement the
Lisbon European Council’s call for economic reform2. The
new regime reflects on the 1996 European Commission’s
Green Paper on Public Procurement3 and the subsequent
1998 Commission’s Communication4.
The competitive dialogue is the most publicized change
brought about by the new public procurement regime. Its
inception is attributed to three reasons: (i) the inability of
open or restricted procedures to facilitate the award of
complex public contracts, including concessions and
public-private partnerships, (ii) the exceptional nature of
negotiated procedures without prior advertisement;5 and
(iii) the restrictive interpretation6 of the grounds for using
negotiated procedures with prior advertisement.
Article 29 of the public sector Directive establishes the
competitive dialogue as an award procedure, alongside
open, restricted and negotiated procedures. The
competitive dialogue must be used exceptionally in cases of
particularly complex contracts, where the use of the open
or restricted procedures will not allow the award of the
contract, and the use of negotiated procedures cannot be
justified. A public contract is considered to be particularly
complex where the contracting authorities are not able to
define in an objective manner the technical specifications
which are required to pursue the project, or they are not
able to specify the legal or financial make-up of a project.
The procedure is very complex, as it has three main
phases and many options within these phases. Firstly, the
advertisement phase according to Article 29(2) obliges
contracting authorities to publish a contract notice or a
descriptive document outlining their needs and basic
specifications of the project. After that phase, and before
launching a competitive dialogue for the award of a
contract, contracting authorities may, using a technical
dialogue, seek or accept advice which may be used in the
preparation of the specifications, provided that such advice
does not have the effect of precluding competition.
Secondly, a selection phase reduces the candidates to be
invited to the competitive dialogue according to the
relevant provisions of Articles 44–52 of the public sector
Directive7. The minimum number of candidates should be
three, but it could be lower if there is sufficient evidence of
competitiveness in the process or the limited number of
initial respondents to the contract notice precludes the
invitation of at least three candidates.
Thirdly, the competitive dialogue is opened by the
commencement of the award phase in accordance with
Article 29(3). Contracting authorities must open a
dialogue with the candidates selected, the aim of which is
to identify the means best suited to satisfying their needs.
They may discuss all aspects of the contract with the
chosen candidates, ensuring equality of treatment among
all tenderers. In particular, they must not provide
information in a discriminatory manner which may give
some tenderers an advantage over others. Contracting
authorities may not reveal to the other participants’
solutions proposed or other confidential information
communicated by a candidate participating in the dialogue
without prior agreement granted from that candidate.
Contracting authorities may provide for the competitive
dialogue to take place in successive stages in order to
reduce the number of solutions to be discussed with the
candidates in accordance with Article 29(4). They may
continue the dialogue until they can identify the solution or
solutions which are capable of meeting their needs. Having
declared that the dialogue is concluded and having
informed the participants, contracting authorities must ask
them to submit their final tenders on the basis of the
solution or solutions presented and specified during the
dialogue.
After this phase is over (closure of the competitive
dialogue), there are four stages until the contract award.
Firstly, contracting authorities must ask all remaining
candidates to submit their final tenders (Article 44(4)).
Secondly, these tenders need to be finalized prior to their
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evaluation (Article 29(6)). Thirdly, the selection of the
winning tenderer must take place in accordance with the
criteria stipulated in the contract notice (Article 29(7)),
and fourthly the winning tenderer must provide further
clarification and his commitment to undertake the project
(Article 29(7)).
The tenders must contain all the elements required and
considered necessary for the performance of the project.
They may be clarified, specified and fine-tuned at the
request of the contracting authority. However, any
additional information must not involve any changes to the
basic features of the tender or the call for tender, nor allow
for variations which are likely to distort competition or
have a discriminatory effect. In the author’s view, there is
a great deal of uncertainty over the meaning of clarification,
additional provision of tender specification and the extent
of fine-tuning, to the degree of compromising the
competitiveness and integrity of the procedure.
Contracting authorities must assess the tenders received
on the basis of the award criteria laid down in the contract
notice or the descriptive document and must choose the
most economically advantageous tender in accordance with
Article 53. At the request of the contracting authority, the
tenderer identified as having submitted the most
economically advantageous tender may be asked to clarify
aspects of the tender or confirm commitments contained
in the tender provided this does not have the effect of
modifying substantial aspects of the tender, or of the call
for tender, and does not risk distorting competition or
discriminating against other candidates.
Overall, the competitive dialogue has addressed many of
the features that are important during the award of
complex projects and are currently being addressed by
negotiated procedures with prior advertisement. In
comparison with these procedures, the competitive
dialogue allows also for a limited number of participants
(three in number), introduces a staged approach to
tendering and permits elimination of participants during
its internal phases. However it allows significant scope for
post-tender negotiations, but it restricts the award of a
contract to complete offers.
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